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NOTE: CALVIN V. CHATER: THE RIGHT TO
SUBPOENA THE PHYSICIAN IN SSA CASES
CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER THE
INTERPRETATION OF 20 C.F.R. 404.950(D)(1)
Elliot B. Oppenheim, J.D., M.D.*
I. Introduction
The inconsistency between two decisions among the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits has created a administrative law conundrum which could upset hearings
procedures which affect over two million Social Security Administration claimants
a year. This matter concerns whether a claimant has an automatic right to receive
a subpoena under SSA regulations in order to cross-examine an examining physician
at the Administrative Law Judge, or Appeals Council levels. It is startling that this
matter remains unsettled at this time.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the 1996 case
of Calvin v. Chater' denied a claim for supplemental security income. The denial
rejected Senior District Judge Odell Horton's holding that the claimant had an
absolute right to a subpoena in order to conduct oral examination of the claimant's
treating physician. The appellate court held the claimant's right to cross-examine
adverse witness subject to the Social Security Administration's published rule which
governed subpoenas and found the Agency's decision to deny the party's right to
cross-examine the physician in live testimony did not constitute an abuse of
2
discretion in the issuance of the subpoena.

The Sixth Circuit decision in Calvin conflicts with a 1990 Filth Circuit

*The author is an LLM student at Loyola University School of Law, Health
Law Institute. The author wishes to thank Professor Allen Shoenberger for his comments
and encouragement and Ms. Claudia Day for her assistance with this manuscript and
critical comments.

87 (6th Cir. 1996).
'73
2 F.3d
Id. at 87.
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ruling in Lidy v. Sullivan,3 which came to an "opposite assumption."4 In Lidy, the
lower court granted summary judgment and upheld denial of the applicant's claim.
The Fifth Circuit held, however, that by merely requesting a subpoena the claimant
had the automatic right to cross-examine an examining physician.5
In response to the Lidy decision, at the end of 1991, the Social Security
Administration6 issued an Acquiescence Ruling 7 in which the Agency referenced the
Fifth Circuit decision. The AR stated that "The Fifth Circuit has held [that].. .the
right to a subpoena for the purposes of cross-examining an examining physician is
absolute. " The AR noted that Fifth Circuit rested its analysis on its interpretation
of Richardsonv. Perales,9 but SSA believed that the Agency was required to issue
a subpoena "only when it is shown that the testimony sought is reasonably necessary
for the full presentation of a case."'" SSA in the AR took the position that in view
of the conflict between SSA instructions" and the Lidy holding, SSA's policy would
be "that a claimant's right to a subpoena is qualified." 2
In order to meet the Lidy court's requirement, SSA indicated that the
holding applied "only to cases involving claimants for disability insurance benefits

'911
F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991).
4
Calvin 73 F.3d 87, 92.
'Lidy, 911 iF.2d at 1075.
6
7 Hereinafter, SSA.

SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN.: RIGHT TO SUBPOENA AN
EXAMrNTNG PHYsiCIAN FOR
CROSs-EXAMINATION PURPOSES-TITLES I AND XVI OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ACT:

ACQUIESCENCE RULING 91-1(5)I)(p) (12-31-91). Hereinafter, AR.
8

ld.
'Id.citing Richardson v. Perales,402 U.S. 389 (1971).
°Id.
"Id. Stating that under current S.S.A. Regulations at 20 C.F.R. 404.950(d);

416.1450(d), that an AD may deny the claimant's request to subpoena an individual if
the claimant fails to show that the evidence or testimony.. .is essential, or that the evidence

or testimony cannot be obtained in any other way." However, there is an exception to the

policy when "securing expert medical opinion after a hearing...." AR. 9 1-1(5)(i)(p). Then,
if the claimant objects to the use of interrogatories and requests a supplemental hearing,
the ALJ must grant the request.

12d.
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and/or supplemental insurance income payments..."who reside in Louisiana,
Mississippi, or Texas at the time of the respective judicial hearings at the disability,
ALJ,or Appeals Council levels. In contradistinction to the rest of the country, in
those states "...when a claimant request.. .that a subpoena be issued for the purpose
of cross-examining an examining physician, the adjudicator must issue the
subpoena." 3
Under current law, then, there exists an uneasy tension. Those persons
bound by the Fifth Circuit, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, follow the 1990 Lidy
line of authority under AR 91-1(5(1)(p), a mandatory issuance of subpoena
jurisdiction, whereas the rest of the country, under federal law, will follow the Calvin
Sixth Circuit interpretation of same issue, granting a subpoena only when it is
"reasonably necessary for full presentation of a case." This Note will examine how
this unusual legal conflict developed and propose a logical resolution since it is
impossible to ignore the potential consequences if claimants were able to compel
every examining physician to testify at every hearing.
H.Background
Judge Nelson framed the discussion for the following cases when he
pinpointed the issue in Calvin:
Where a person asserting a claim... asks that a
reporting physician be subpoenaed to testify on crossexamination at the claimant's hearing before an
administrative law judge, must the request for a
subpoena be honored even if the claimant has failed
to justify the request in the manner prescribed by the
applicable social security regulations?14
While the District Court would have permitted the subpoena and remanded the case
back to the Agency in order to subpoena the physician for cross-examination, the

1Id.
14Calvin, 73 F.3d p. 88.
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Appellate Court concluded that "a claimant is not entitled to ignore" SSA
regulations. 5
Mr. Calvin applied for Supplemental Security Income after he became
disabled following a bout of acute renal failure. 6 Calvin accepted his denial until
he was notified three years later that he was entitled to review under the Samuels v.
Heckler decision. As part of reopening his claim, Mr. Calvin underwent a
consultative examination by Dr. Rawlinson and that physician prepared a report,
including a two-page SSA medical assessment form. This report was consistent
with another report prepared by Dr. Menees, a consultant retained by claimant.
Mr. Calvin's second claim was denied and prior to the hearing Calvin's
attorney objected to both the Rawlinson report and the medical assessment form. At
this time, it was Calvin's position that unless he was permitted the opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Rawlinson, the report and medical assessment should be entirely
disallowed.'"
The claimant cited as authority 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d), which authorizes
an ALJ "to issue a subpoena... [w]hen it is reasonably necessary for the full
presentation of a case...""9 However, the regulation requires that the party wishing
a subpoena state, "the important facts that the witness or document is expected to
prove; and indicate why these facts could not be proven without issuing a
subpoena."20
The court observed that in its subpoena request, the claimant did not
suggest that Dr. Rawlinson was biased, that it did not refer to any "important facts"
which it expected to be developed by the intended cross-examination, nor did the

"5Id. at 88

"There were also some complications with the anti-coagulant Coumadin but
these are unimportant to the legal issues.
7Calvin, 73 F.3d at p. 89.
"Calvin 73 F.3d at p. 89
191d,
2020

CFR § 416.1450(DX2).
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request state why these facts could not be proved through written interrogatories.
The court denied the subpoena, the Rawlinson report was admitted2 and the
claimant lost.22 The ALJ explained the denial as within the privilege of judicial
discretion under the regulation23 and furthermore, that to subpoena Dr. Rawlinson
"would serve no useful purpose.. since interrogatories" would suffice. 4
Calvin appealed to the United States District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee, citing both Lidy v,Sullivan and Richardson v. Perales. The District
Court held that Mr. Calvin did have "an absolute right, based upon due process
considerations, to conduct live cross-examination..." and remanded to the Agency.2
The Agency then appealed to the Sixth Circuit which reversed the district court.
Under the Social Security Act, the Secretary has "full" rule making power26
and the Sixth Circuit presumed that the regulation was valid. 27 Mr. Calvin "offered
no explanation of how the regulation" fell short of the "statutorily prescribed
reasonable and proper' standard
29

Procedure Act,

2

Calvin argued that the Administrative

permits administrative hearing officers the authority to issue

subpoenas and that under 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) a party is permitted to conduct a cross-

1Cavin,73

.3d. at 89.
M. Ca'lvin sattorney admitted that "the request for a subpoena did not
meet the requirements of the regulation." Id.at 90, n.2.
3Id.
at 90, citing 20 CFR § 416.1450(d)(1X2).
24

Calvin, 73 F.3d at 90. Berger v. Secretary, 835 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1987).

"Denial of Mrs. Berger's subpoena request did not prevent her from receiving a fair and
full hearing before the Administrative Law Judge."
"Id. Calvin, 73 F.3d at 90-91.
"6Id. Citing the Congressional delegation of power codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(a)) which the court presumed valid. SSA may "regulate and provide for the
nature and extent of proofs and evidence... [as well as] the 'method of taking and
furnishing" evidence. § 405(a).
"Calvin, 73 F.3d at 90-91, citing Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715,

721-22 (6th Cir. 1979), affid, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
2
"Cahin, 73 F.3d at 9 1. Mr. Calvin died while this ease proceeded through
the courts. Id. at 91, n. 3.
29
d., citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(cX3). [hereinafter, APA]. APA § 556(c) states
"Subject to published rules of the agency and within its powers, employees presiding at
hearings may... issue subpoenas authorized by law...."
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examination "as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."3" The
court reasoned that under the en banc opinion of Mullen v. Bowen,3 the SSA must
conform to the requirements of the APA and the Act "explicitly" states that the
permission to issue such subpoenas rests with the published rules of the agency.32
Calvin admitted that he did not comply with the Agency rule" and the court
observed here, too, that this rule did not conflict with the APA, § 556(d), since the
APA regulation "does not prevent a party who complies with its terms from putting
himself in a position to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts."'34 The court explained that if the party complies
with the rule and demonstrated that cross-examination is required, "the subpoena
will presumably be issued."3
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) permits that the Rawlinson report could
be admitted even if it were hearsay, even if he were not present for crossexamination.' The court then considered the factual aspects of the Rawlinson report
in terms of whether it would actually have made some sort of real-world difference.
The court determined that the Menees' Report was more contemporaneous to the
period of disability at issue, noting that the Rawlinson findings did not contradict
other medical evidence, "and there had been no suggestion of bias....""
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Calvin from the 1983 Ninth Circuit
decision of Solis v. Schweiker.38 In Solis the claimant wanted to cross-examine a

3

Calvin, 73 F.3d at 91, citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).

"800 F.2d 535, 536 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
3"Calvin, 73 F.3d at 91. Under 5 U.S.C. § 556(c).
33
Calvin, 73 F.3d at 91.
34Id.

351d.

3642 U.S.C. § 405(b) provides that "[e]vidence may be received
at any hearing
before the Secretary even though inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court
procedure."
17Calvin, 73 F.3d at 91.
3
ld., citing, Solis v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1983).
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medical witness "whose report was in substantial conflict with" reports from other
doctors. The court found that the claimant had a due process right to the granting
of the request for a subpoena. When the Ninth Circuit granted his request it affirmed
39
is warranted."
that the ALJ "has discretion to decide when cross-examination
In contrast to Solis, however, there was no conflict in Calvin between
reports. The Calvin court also relied upon Judge Parkers ruling in Long v. United
States' ° upon which the United States Supreme Court rested its important decision
in Richardson v. Perales. In Long, the court held admissible reports such as the
Rawlinson report in Calvin under a hearsay exception, in part because "their
41
testimony 'is ordinarily a mere recital"' of what they wrote in their reports. Judge
Parker reasoned that the physician would only refresh his recollection from his
report, therefore, the report is more reliable than the physician's memory.
Furthermore, Judge Parker continued, if a witness were to attempt to contradict the
"statements contained in the reports, the reports would be accepted by any trier of
42
facts in preference to oral testimony." Judge Parker stated that, "[tihe written
record of an examination made at the time is undoubtedly more trustworthy than the

treacherous memory of a busy man dealing with many cases having many points of
similarity."43 The reports were preferable to oral testimony since "they are more
"
dependable...and are...the best evidence obtainable.... "

In Perales, the Supreme Court relied upon Judge Parker's persuasive
reasoning when it held that the "physician's written report 'may constitute substantial
evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing examiner adverse to the

39
40Calvn, 73

F.3d at 92., citing Solis, 719 F.2d at 302.

Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92. Long involved reports from physician employees in
the Veterans Bureau by physicians who were ordinarily not available at hearings. These
examined hundreds of disabled soldiers.
physicians 41
Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92.
42Id.
43

Id.

4Id., citing, Long, 59 F.2d 602,603-604.
149
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claimant.....' 45 The Calvin court differed with the Peralesreasoning in that it did not
find the right to subpoena "absolute" since the right is not automatic "whether or not
[the claimant] has complied with the published rules...." 4' The Peralescourt also
factored in the "substantial drain" on both the Agency md the involved physicians47
such a rule would entail.
The Calvin court further distinguished Lidy from Calvin on its facts by
noting that the Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit described Judge Parker's famous
passage as less than "pellucid," and it reached the opposite assumption

The Lidy

court noted that subsequent to the passage from page 406 of Perales, the Supreme
Court

"refers to the

'use of the subpoena

and

consequent

cross-

examination'... suggesting that such cross-examination necessarily follows from the
filing of a request for a subpoena.

49

The Calvin Court rejected this rationale for it "did not see why crossexamination should.. follow from the filling of a subpoena request" when the request
fails to comply with a regulation which requires a showing of some need for that
cross-examination.

The Calvin court found the APA controlling;" [the APA] is

the standard.... It is clear and workable and does not fall short of procedural due
process. ""' In conclusion, the Calvin opinion analyzed that if the party requesting
the subpoena makes no attempt to justify his request, then he is not entitled to the
subpoena. Further, as the court in Lidy observe, "when the Perales Court spoke of
the claimant's non-exercise of 'his right to subpoena the reporting physician,' the
2
Court did not speak of the 'right to request a subpoena. 1'

4 Calvin, 73
46

F.3d at 92., citing Perales,402 U.S, at 402.

Id.

4'1d.
4

, cting Perales406 U.S. at 406.

Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92.

49Id. ,

citing Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.

5 Calvin, 73

F.3d at 92-93.

"Calvin, 73 F.3d at 93, citing Perales,402 U.S. at 410.
52

Calvin, 73 F.3d at 93, citing Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
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3
In Lidy the physician answered interrogatories in a "vague and evasive0

manner. In Calvin, the Court concluded its analysis by denying is automaticity
within the subpoena granting statute and explained its opinion by stating, "[i]f '[due
process requires that a claimant be given an opportunity to cross-examine and
subpoena the individuals who submit reports, it does not seem to us that the agency
charged by statute with responsibility for issuing regulations telling claimants how
to avail themselves of this opportunity is constitutionally precluded from prescribing
reasonable and proper requirements of the sort found in" the [regulations.] ....

Mr.

Calvin's lawyer ignored those requirements at his peril...."54
I. Analysis
May a claimant fully air his case without having access to an automatic
subpoena which would subject his examining physician to cross-examination? Is it
an unreasonable rule to require a threshold showing of need for subpoena in these
cases? In most adversary situations parties are permitted to present all relevant
evidence which would be probative." The Federal Rules of Evidence "secure
fairness in administration.. .to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."5" In most situations before federal tribunals, then,
relevant evidence may be excluded if, "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, ...or by
considerations of undo delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.",
Under SSA regulations, as above discussed, the Agency may determine to
what extent and under what circumstances it will permit cross-examination of
examining physicians. It does not seem unjust that claimants would be required to

53Calvin, 73
4Calvin, 73

F.3d at 93, citinfLidy, 911 F.2d at 1076.)

F.3d at 93. Cita ions to Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1076 and Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) omitted.
55FED. R. EviD. 401,402.
5
FED. R. EviD. 102.
5'FED. R. EviD. 403.
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present some evidence to satisfy a reasonableness standard prior to issuance of
subpoenas. To make subpoena issuance automatic could place an excessive burden
on already overburdened physicians, and cost the trust fund dearly.
The Calvin holding harmonizes with all of constitutional principles of due
process, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the majority of case law, and a sense of "fair
play." The alternative encourages the opposite and would-tend to prolong the SSI
process. To that end, SSA's position in the wake of the Lidy decision represents a
well reasoned agency acquiescence in order to settle judicial discord58 and is the
better rule.
The Solicitor General of the United States sought the grant of a writ
certiorari Fifth Circuit's decision in Lidy, stating that the court should grant the
petition because of the conflict this decision created with other courts of appeals.

9

Additionally, "the holding that every applicant for federal disability benefits has an
'absolute right' to subpoena and orally examine every reporting physician threatens
to impose enormous financial and procedural burdens under which [m]illions of
claims are filed every year."' The Solicitor General also pointed out that "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."'

It seems reasonable that all courts should adopt the Calvin

rule. However, since the Supreme Court denied certiorari,62 the matter remains
unresolved.

s8For a thorough discussion of this area of non-acquiescence, see, Stieberger
v. Heckler, 615 F.Supp. 1315 (1985), vacated and remanded, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986). See also, generally,Robert J.. Axelrod, The PoliticsofNonacquiescence: The
Legacy ofStieberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOK.L.REv. 765 (1994); Dan T. Coenen, The
ConstitutionalCaseAgainst IntracircuitNonacquiescence, 75 MmNN.L.REv. 1339

(1991).

59

Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari at 7.

'Id. , eting FED. R. EviD. 401,402. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424
(1988).
"Id. at 8, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
2
Cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991).
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Calvin should be the preferred interpretation of the subpoena issue, but a
careful reading of Calvin' 3 reveals that the court supported its holding with respect
to APA § 205(g) 4 on a dictum; footnote one from Mullen v. Bowen.

63

Footnote

one stated, in relevant part, "[h]earings under section 205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 405(b),
must also conform to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 556-557." No authority is cited for this statement, nor, does such authority
exist as far as could be discovered. The proposition appears a mere assumption.
The significance is that Calvin, the case litigants may look to for guidance, may
perilously rest on this unsupported dictum from Mullen v. Bowen.
The Sixth Circuit in Muller decided what law should be applied to "resolve
an inconsistency between two decisions by different panels.. .relating to the role of
the Appeals Council in the scheme of review of disability determinations."" Then,
the court moved on to a second issue, the applicable standard of review, 7 and as part
of those issues, parenthetically placed footnote one as part of the court's "brief
overview of the relationship between the Secretary and the Appeals Council under
the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder."" The court then
discussed § 205(b)(1) and the section authorizing the Secretary to conduct
investigations and hearings "as he may deem necessary or proper." The court did not
discuss section 205(g), however, relegating this important aspect, which strongly
supports the Calvin opinion, to footnote status. Section 205(g) provides in part,
"where a claim has been denied ...

because of failure of the claimant or such

individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under
subsection (a) of this section the court shall review only the question of conformity

'The editors and author would like to acknowledge Chicago Attorney Eric
Schnaufer who brought the footnote to the Journal's attention.
"Calvin, 73 F.3d 87, 91.
'6800F.2d 535, 536 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
"Mullen,
800 F.2d 535, 536.
7

6Id.
6Id.
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with such regulations and the validity of such regulations." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(emphasis added).
A dictum can never be mandatory authority, however, and if the court
which wrote the dictum can reverse the court in which the current matter resides, the
dictum could become especially influential. That, however, is not the case where
both Calvin and Mullen arose from the Sixth Circuit and that particular discord is
intracircuit. Interestingly, Judge Nelson sat on both cases!
IV.Conclusion
The CalvinlLidy problem requires Supreme Court resolution since this is
a major national issue. This matter is no footnote in a cobwebbed archive. Whether
the important Calvin decision rests uneasily on a dictum or firmly on statutory
language will be a matter for the Supreme Court to consider. Calvin is the only
tenable treatment of this problem. What is so astonishing is that this matter has
remained unresolved for so long. Very few areas of evidence involve inflexible rules
and most, especially where cost and human resources will be expended, interpose
judicial discretion in the regulation of the expenditure.
It is untenable that there is one rule for Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi,
another rule for the Sixth Circuit, and confusion for the rest of the nation. the rule
in Calvin, which requires that a subpoena may be issued when the testimony sought
is reasonably necessary for the full presentation of the claimant's case, embraces all
legal principles and is the rule the Supreme Court should recognize and adopt.
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